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SELF-DETERMINATION vs. STABILITY OF LABOR 
RELATIONS 
THE EFFECT OF American Potash 
Dallas L. Jones* 
SELF-DETERMINATION and stability of labor relations are two basic objectives of our national labor relations policy. Con-
gress assumed, when it passed the Wagner Act, that self-determina-
tion - the right of employees to engage, if they so desired, in 
collective bargaining with representatives of their own choosing -
would promote industrial peace. It was soon found, however, that 
in many instances self-determination might not be compatible 
with the goal of stable labor relations. One such instance, and one 
of continuing difficulty, is that of skilled workers within an in-
dustrial unit. 
In part, this problem resulted from an unforeseen develop-
ment - the split in the labor movement. At the time the Wagner 
Act was enacted, the AFL, composed largely of craft unions, rep-
resented the labor movement. An important principle of the AFL 
was that of "exclusive junsdiction" - the grant to a national union 
of the sole right to organize workers in a particular trade or craft. 
The purposes behind this principle were, of course, to prevent 
"dual unionism" - two unions in one trade - and to prevent 
jurisdictional conflicts over who would organize the workers and 
who would do the work. Although the concept of "exclusive juris-
diction" was never completely successful in solving jurisdictional 
disputes within the AFL before 1935, it had provided a framework 
for organizational purposes and it had prevented to a large extent 
"dual unionism." 
It is not surprising, therefore, that Congress did not seriously 
consider the question of self-determination in terms of which 
union would represent the workers, but, instead, considered the 
question largely in terms of whether the workers desired any union 
representation. The Wagner Act was thus written to reflect the 
• Associate Professor of Industrial Relations, The University of Michigan.-Ed. 
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majority attitude toward unionism without great concern for which 
union might be chosen. Congress did, however, approach this 
question when it placed upon the National Labor Relations Board 
the responsibility for designating the appropriate unit for col-
lective bargaining. Realizing that it was necessary to establish 
which group of workers should be polled as to their desires re-
garding unionism, Congress directed the Board in section 9 (b), to 
"decide in each case whether, in order to insure to employees the 
full benefit of their right to self-organization and to collective bar-
gaining, and otherwise to effectuate the policies of this Act, the 
unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be 
the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof." 
Although there would have been problems connected with self-
determination in an appropriate unit in any event, these problems 
were intensified by the division in the labor movement. 
With the emergence of industrial unions under the CIO, the 
principle of "exclusive jurisdiction" was no longer effective. The 
industrial unions ignored craft boundaries and attempted to or-
ganize all workers in'a given plant or industry. The NLRB would 
then be requested to designate as the appropriate unit for collec-
tive bargaining, a broad "production and maintenance" unit - a 
"p and m" unit - that would include both production and skiHed 
workers. In many instances, the skilled workers supported the in-
dustrial union, but in others they desired craft representation. In 
still other cases, the skilled workers at first supported the industrial 
union and then changed their minds and asked for craft representa-
tion. The Board soon found, therefore, that in fulfilling its obli-
gation to designate the appropriate unit for collective bargaining 
it had to choose between a unit which allowed all workers a full 
measure of self-determination or one which it believed would most 
benefit the majority of the employees and otherwise "effectuate 
the policies of [the] Act" - i.e., promote industrial stability. 
The latest definitive action of the NLRB in dealing with this 
problem is contained in its decision in the American Potash case.1 
The purpose of this article is to present empirical findings on the 
effect of that decision upon the development of stable labor re-
lations. A brief review of the steps leading to Potash and of the 
policy enunciated there may be helpful in understanding the 
problem. 
1107 N.L.R.B. 1418 (1954). 
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American Can to American Potash 
Very early in its history, the Board was confronted with con-
flicting claims by craft unions and industrial unions for the right 
to represent craft workers. Generally, the industrial unions sought 
a broad unit of production and craft workers, whereas the craft 
unions sought units of their particular skill.2 The Board's first re-
action was to establish broad units where it appeared that one 
union had a majority throughout the plant. In doing so, the Board 
relied heavily upon what it considered best for collective bargain-
ing purposes. In many cases, the Board created large units over 
the protests of small gr:oups on the basis that the larger unit would 
best serve the interests of the majority by insuring to them the 
fullest benefits of the act through the promotion of effective 
collective bargaining and peaceful labor relations.3 
This policy, however, met with considerable protest, and in 
1937 the trend was reversed; in that year the Board evolved the 
so-called "Globe" doctrine4 which, in most instances, allowed craft 
workers in initial representation elections to determine whether 
they wished to be included in the plant-wide unit or to have sep-
arate craft units. Although this action was opposed by some 
members of the Board on the basis that it provided self-determina-
tion for a small group of workers at the expense of the majority,5 
the principle was established. Self-determination in these instances 
was thus given precedence over what some Board members consid-
ered more important - the unit most appropriate for collective 
bargaining. 6 
The Board was far more reluctant, however, to allow craftsmen 
who had been blanketed into a larger unit, or who had changed 
their minds about their representative and desired craft representa-
tion, to extricate themselves from the larger unit. The first re-
action of the Board was to prohibit the severance of craft workers 
from a "p and m" unit. This principle, established in the American 
2 In some cases, of course, former craft unions such as the Machinists began to 
organize on a broader basis. Thus, the Machinists would seek either a "p and m" unit 
or a craft unit, and which one sought would be determined by the chance of success. 
3 This policy was also pursued in regard to multi-plant and multi-employer bargain-
ing. See the author's "The NLRB and the Multiemployer Unit," in 5 LAB. L.J. 34 (1954). 
4' Globe Machine and Stamping Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 294 (1937). 
5 Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 159 (1937). 
6 The unit most appropriate for collective bargaining was given primary importance in 
some instances. This was especially true in the creation of multi-employer units. See Jones, 
"The NLRB and the Multiemployer Unit,'' 5 LAn. L.J. 34 at 35-36 (1954). 
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Can case in 1939,7 remained unchanged until 1942. In 1942, the 
Board, which had been under constant pressure from the AFL, 
agreed to conduct severance elections for those craft workers who 
had resisted the efforts of the industrial unions to win their 
allegiance.8 This break in the rigid nonseverance rule led to the 
principle established in the General Electric case of 1944.9 In that 
case, the Board held that severance of craft groups from a "p and 
m" unit would be permitted if the following conditions were met: 
(1) if the group seeking severance constituted a true craft group 
and not a dissident faction; (2) if the group had maintained its 
identity during the period of bargaining upon a more comprehen-
sive basis; and (3) if the group had protested its inclusion in the 
broader unit, or, in the alternative, had no knowledge at the time 
the unit was created that a broad "p and m" unit was being con-
sidered. By 194 7, the Board had discarded the identity criterion, 
although initially it had been very important.10 Moreover, the 
Board at this time began to allow the severance of departmental 
units, such as powerhouse workers, which could not qualify as craft 
groups.11 Again, as these developments occurred, there was vig-
orous protest by some Board members that these decisions were not 
conducive to stable collective bargaining.12 
By 1947, when the National Labor Relations Act was amended, 
the Board's policy was in general, therefore, one which gave great 
emphasis to self-determination - if the above conditions were met, 
the Board almost automatically ordered a severance election.13 
The Taft-Hartley changes appeared not only to support the Board's 
policy_ toward severance but also appeared to encourage the Board 
to enlarge upon it. An amendment to section 9 (b) provided that 
a craft unit was not to be found inappropriate for collective bar-
gaining on the basis that a broader unit had been previously estab-
lished unless the affected craft workers had voted against separate 
representation. Moreover, the phrase "and otherwise to effectuate 
7 13 N.L.R.B. 1252 (1939). 
8 Bendix Aviation Corp., 39 N.L.R.B. 81 (1942). 
9 58 N.L.R.B. 57 (1944). 
10 International Minerals and Chemical Corp., 71 N.L.R.B. 878 (1946). For a full dis-
cussion of these principles and the cases which led to them, see Krislov, "Administrative 
Approaches to Craft Severance," 5 LAB. L.J. 231 at 234-235 (1954); Weiner, "The Appro-
priate Bargaining Unit," NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SIXm ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 515 
at 527 (1953). 
11E. I. DuPont, 73 N.L.R.B. 1167 (1947). 
12 Phelps Dodge Corp., 60 N.L.R.B. 1431 (1945). 
13 Krislov, "Administrative Approaches to Craft Severance," 5 LAB. L.J. 231 at 233 
(1954). 
1960] SELF-DETERMINATION AND LABOR RELATIONS 317 
the policies of this Act" was eliminated and the section was changed 
to read "in order to insure employees the fullest freedom in exercis-
ing their rights guaranteed by this Act, the unit appropriate for 
collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, or sub-
division thereof .... " (Emphasis added.) 
These changes in the act, however, did not speed up the process 
of craft severance. Instead, as Krislov has pointed out, the Board 
adopted policies which actually limited severance.14 The Board 
did this in two ways: (I) by giving more consideration to the 
nature of the industry in determining if a craft unit were appro-
priate, and (2) by defining more carefully the characteristics of 
the group seeking severance to determine if the group represented 
a true craft. With these policy changes~ especially as a result of 
the first, stability of labor relations again became an important 
consideration. 
Almost immediately after the amendments to section 9 were 
passed, the craft unions argued before the Board that the changes 
called for mandatory craft severance elections. The craft unions 
also contended that, in determining the appropriate unit, the 
Board was precluded from utilizing the factors of prior unit 
determination and collective bargaining history. 
These arguments were rejected by the Board in the National 
Tube case.15 The Board held instead that although the amend-
ments prohibited the Board from finding a craft unit inappropriate 
solely because a different unit had been established, the Board still 
had the duty of determining in each case the appropriate unit for 
collective bargaining. In determining the appropriate unit, the 
Board declared that it could use the factors which it had utilized 
in the past, including prior unit determinations, as long as there 
was no reliance as such on past Board decisions. 
With the question of mandatory elections resolved, the Board 
then denied the petition of the bricklayers for a separate unit even 
though the group constituted an appropriate unit for severance 
under the Board's criteria. The Board's reason for denying the 
petition was the high degree of integration between the work of 
the bricklayers and the entire production process. This integration 
of work, the Board declared, precluded severance in the basic steel 
industry.16 The National Tube doctrine of integration was later 
14 Id. at 234. 
15 76 N.L.R.B. 1199 (1948). 
16 Ibid. 
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applied to aluminum, lumber, and wet milling;17 in these indus-
tries, stability of labor relations was given precedence over self-
determination. 
Prior to the 194 7 amendments to the act, the Board had not 
been particularly concerned whether the group seeking severance 
was a true craft as long as it had a specialized skill. Following the 
passage of the amendments, the Board set forth more precise 
criteria to determine whether the group was a craft unit and thus 
eligible for severance. These criteria included the presence and 
quality of an apprenticeship program, the amount of skill required 
to do the work, the place or location where the work was per-
formed, and the type of supervision required. In addition, all 
workers in the total unit with the same skill had to be included in 
the proposed craft unit; and, if the craft unit sought was in a multi-
plant company or in a multi-employer group, the proposed craft 
unit had to include all craftsmen in all plants.18 
The Board continued to allow the severance of departmental 
groups, but here too the Board set forth more precise criteria to 
determine whether such a group was appropriate for severance. 
Thus, the departmental group had to have a craft nucleus, it had 
to be identifiable and homogeneous, it had to perform work dif-
ferent from that performed in the rest of the plant, and it had to 
include all of a particular kind of employees in the plant.19 This 
latter criterion became of especial importance in the Westinghouse 
case when the Board denied a petition for the severance of a depart-
mental unit of tool room employees when it was found that there 
were tool and die makers in another department.20 Moreover, the 
Board also denied the severance of departmental units when it 
found that the work of the department was highly integrated with 
the production process.21 
American Potash 
After the election of President Eisenhower in 1952, there was 
a change in the composition of the NLRB; this change in turn led 
17 Permanente Metals Corp., 89 N.L.R.B. 804 (1950); Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 87 
N.L.R.B. 1076 (1949); Corn Products Refining Corp., 80 N.L.R.B. 362 (1948). 
18 Krislov, "Administrative Approaches to Craft Severance," 5 LAB. L.J. 231 at 234-237 
(1954), and Weiner, "The Appropriate Bargaining Unit," NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SDC.TH 
ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 515 at 529-532 (1953) discuss the cases which led to these 
principles. 
19 Ibid. See particularly Allis Chalmers, 77 N.L.R.B. 719 (1948). 
20 Westinghouse Electric Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 441 (1952). 
21 General Electric, 89 N.L.R.B. 726 (1950). 
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to a re-evaluation of the craft-severance doctrine. The results of 
that re-evaluation were announced in the American Potash case22 
-a decision which in effect accepted the arguments advanced 
by the bricklayers in the National Tube case. 
It was the Board's opinion that if the conditions for separate 
representation were present - a true craft status and a proposed 
representative that had traditionally represented the craft - the 
group had to be afforded the opportunity to decide for itself the 
issue of separate representation. The principle was to apply in all 
industries, including highly integrated ones, except that it would 
not be extended to those industries in which the National Tube 
ruling had been applied.23 
This position, the Board stated, was consistent with the clear 
intent of Congress in this matter. According to the Board, it was 
not the purpose of Congress to have the Board "dictate the course 
and pattern of labor organization in our vast industrial complex." 
If employees believed that they could be better served by craft 
unionism, the Board believed that it was not within its province 
to say that they had to be represented on an industrial basis. Em-
ployees, declared the Board, must be given the opportunity to 
decide the issue for themselves if the intent of Congress and the 
statute were to be effectuated. 24 
In adopting this rule, the Board declared that it had given 
"grave consideration" to the arguments that craft severance would 
cause industrial unrest and would reduce maximum efficiency in 
the integrated industries. The Board agreed that the new policy 
might cause some unrest, but the Board contended that the alter-
native of denying craft workers separate representation, as proved 
under the American Can experience, "was no less productive of 
labor unrest."25 In reply to the argument that craft severance 
would reduce maximum efficiency in integrated industries, the 
Board remarked, "Whatever may be lost in maximum industrial 
22107 N.L.R.B. 1418 (1954). 
23 Id. at 1421-1422. In refusing to order severance elections in these industries, the 
Board stated that it did not wish to disrupt established bargaining relationships. The 
same reasoning could be applied to any industry and, as the court pointed out in Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass Co. case, this section appears discriminatory. NLRB v. Pittsburgh Plate 
Glass Co., (4th Cir. 1959) 270 F. (2d) 167, cert. den. 28 U.S. LAw WEEK 3217 (1960). 
24107 N.L.R.B. 1418 at 1422-1423 (1954). Krislov has argued that the legislative his-
tory of the amendment indicates that Congress did not intend to provide for mandatory 
elections. Krislov, "Administrative Approaches to Craft Severance," 5 LAB. L.J. 231 at 
234 (1954). The court agreed with this position in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., (4th Cir. 
1959) 270 F. (2d) 167, cert. den. 28 U.S. LAw WEEK 3217 (1960). 
211107 N.L.R.B. 1418 at 1422 (1954). 
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efficiency, and experience has not shown that this loss is'measur-
ably greater than that which flowed from the rigid doctrine of 
American Can, is more than compensated for by the gain in indus-
trial democracy and the freedom of employees to choose their own 
unions and their own form of collective bargaining."26 In short, 
the Board held that self-determination was the most important 
objective and that any adverse effects which might occur would be 
more than offset by the benefits which would result from the 
policy. 
The Criteria for Craft Severance Under American Potash 
In setting forth this policy, the Board declared that the require-
ments for craft severance - a true craft and a proposed representa-
tive that had historically represented the craft-would be rigor-
ously enforced. Under this rule, the Board believed that fewer 
craft groups would be eligible for severance than under the prior 
policy.27 Of extreme importance, therefore, is the meaning which 
the Board attached to the above criteria. 
A "true craft unit," declared the Board, is a homogeneous 
group consisting of skilled journeymen craftsmen working together 
with their apprentices and helpers. In order to be considered a 
journeyman, an individual must have a high degree of skill at-
tained only through long training. Such training usually would be 
acquired through an apprenticeship program, although an experi-
ence-equivalent would be recognized. In addition, and of great 
importance, the Board declared that it would not consider a craft 
group eligible for severance unless it included "all craftsmen of 
the same type in any plant, except those in traditional departmental 
units." On the other hand, employees who worked in association 
with the craft but who could not attain craftsman status would be 
excluded.28 
Severance was not to be restricted, however, to "true craft 
units." There were certain other functionally distinct depart-
mental groups, declared the Board, "though lacking the hallmark 
of craft skill," who, because they have common interests in collec-
tive bargaining distinct from those of other employees, should be 
treated as severable units. These "departmental groups which have 
by tradition and practice acquired craft-like characteristics" would 
26 Id. at 1423. 
27Ibid. 
28 Id. at 1423-1424. 
1960] SELF-DETERMINATION AND LABOR RELATIONS 321 
be allowed to sever, if proof were provided that " (I) the depart-
mental group is functionally distinct and separate, and (2) the 
petitioner is a union which has traditionally devoted itself to serv-
ing the special interest of the employees in question."29 Here, as 
well as in cases of "true craft units," the Board placed the burden 
upon the petitioning union of proving that the requested unit was 
appropriate. 30 
The manner in which the Board has applied these criteria is 
of importance to the findings to be discussed below. The tests for 
determining a true craft have, in general, been those stated by the 
Board. There have been, however, some noticeable exceptions. 
Aircraft Welders, who were at first denied craft status, 31 have since 
been accorded it on the basis that welding is a separate and distinc-
tive trade requiring long experience and the petitioning union was 
one that had_ long represented such employees.32 On the other 
hand, the Board has refused to consider units appropriate for sev-
erance in which the people failed to meet craft standards.33 
The Board has also insisted that the union seeking to sever a 
unit be the historical or traditional representative of the group and 
has refused to permit a severance election where the union does 
not meet this requirement. Thus, the Board declared inappro-
priate a maintenance unit composed of many crafts sought by the 
Carpenters, although the Board found appropriate for severance 
a unit which consisted solely of the millwrights.34 
Modification has occurred, however, in the Board's interpreta-
tion of what constitutes a historical and traditional representative. 
In the Elgin Watch case,35 the Board denied the petition of the Die 
and Toolmakers Association to sever a unit of tool and die makers, 
because the union had been in existence for only one year. "A 
newly-formed labor organization," declared the Board,- "can hardly 
be termed a 'traditional' bargaining representative."36 Recon-
sideration of this decision soon followed, however; and, over the 
vigorous protests of Members Beeson and Murdock, the Board 
29 Id. at 1424. 
30 Ibid. 
31Clayton and Lambert Mfg. Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 540 (1955). 
32 Hughes Aircraft Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 98 (1957). 
33 See, for example, Inland Cold Storage Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 973 (1956), where the Board 
refused to consider refrigeration mechanics as craftsmen. 
34 Marinette Paper Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 1452 (1955). 
35109 N.L.R.B. 273 (1954). 
B6 Id. at 275. 
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reversed its position.87 The majority declared that a history of 
existence was only one test and that "a union newly organized for 
the sole and exclusive purpose of representing members of that 
craft, in our view, can be as much a craft union as an older organ-
ization .... "88 The Board believed that to hold differently would 
mean that craft employees would be "forever wedded to the past" 
and that a governmental agency would be granting "monopoly 
rights to particular labor organizations to the point of preventing 
new craft unions desired by employees from coming into being."39 
The Board, therefore, allowed a group of machinists the oppor-
tunity to vote for the newly formed Tool and Die-Craftsmen union. 
Far more complex, and perhaps of more importance in terms 
of stable labor relations, has been the Board's actions regarding 
departmental severance. Many of the former criteria for depart-
mental severance have been retained, but the Board has sub-
stantially modified the rule laid down in the Westinghouse case, 
that the severance of a departmental unit which contained both 
craftsmen and lesser-skilled workers would not be allowed if there 
were similar craftsmen employed outside the department. Al-
though the Board retains this policy for craft units, it does not do 
so for departmental units. Thus, in the A. P. Controls case,40 the 
Machinists sought two departmental units - one of toolroom em-
ployees and the other of model-shop employees. In both units 
there were highly skilled journeymen working with lesser-skilled 
people. There were also journeymen of like skill in the plant who 
were not attached to either of these departments. The Board ruled 
that the two departmental units were appropriate for severance 
even though some craftsmen were excluded.41 
Another important aspect of this problem arises when the 
Board must choose between a craft or departmental unit, when 
both may be appropriate. In many instances, the petitioning union 
requests one or more craft units, or in the alternative, a depart-
mental unit. Thus, in the American Cyanamid case,42 the Ma-
chinists petitioned for eighteen craft units or, in the alternative, a 
unit composed of all maintenance employees. The Board found 
37Friden Calculating Machine Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1618 (1954). The minority continued 
to hold that a "traditional bargaining representative" must have a history of representing . 
w:orkers of the craft. 
as Id. at 1619. 
so Id. at 1619-1620. 
40108 N.L.R.B. 593 (1954). 
41 See also Cessna Aircraft Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 1191 (1955). 
42 110 N.L.R.B. 89 (1954). 
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that a departmental unit was inappropriate but that units of tool-
room machinists, instrument mechanics, scale mechanics, and mill-
wrights were appropriate. 
In another case,43 the Machinists petitioned to sever a depart-
mental unit of machine shop employees. In the department were 
six tool and die makers, twelve machinists, four highly skilled 
machine operators who could advance through the classification to 
journeyman status, and one helper. The Board denied the petition 
for a departmental unit but declared appropriate a craft unit of the 
tool and die makers and the machinists. In doing so, the Board 
remarked that "the machine shop employees . . . constitute a 
functionally distinct departmental group, who may be represented 
as a separate unit by a union which traditionally represents such 
employees."44 It would seem, as the minority of the Board pointed 
out, that under the rules laid down in Potash, the departmental 
unit should have been declared appropriate. The question also 
arises, of course, whether it would not be better in cases of this kind 
to have a departmental unit to prevent undue segmentation. 
There has been very close adherence by the Board to the prin-
ciple enunciated in Potash that integration of the production 
process would not bar severance, except in the National Tube ex-
clusions. Thus, in a case soon after the Potash decision was an-
nounced, the Board refused to give any weight to the argument 
that the maintenance and production functions were highly 
integrated and that the history of collective bargaining in the 
industry should prevent severance. Instead, the Board remarked 
that the only question before it was whether the petitioning union 
met the test laid down in Potash.46 Thus, the Board has not hesi-
tated to order elections in integrated industries. 
Collective bargaining history will act as a bar to craft severance 
only where the petitioning union seeks a unit in a plant of a multi-
plant company that has traditionally bargained on a company-wide 
basis.46 Even here, however, the Board will allow severance if 
43 Kinnear Mfg. Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 948 (1954). 
44 Ibid. See also St. Louis Car Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1388 (1954). Upon occasion the Board 
will declare a departmental unit appropriate even though the petitioning unit had sought 
only a craft unit. See American Bemberg, Division of Beaunit Mills, Inc., 111 N.L.R.B. 
963 (1955). 
46Forstmann Woolen Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1439 (1954). See also North American Avia-
tion, Inc., 115 N.L.R.B. 1090 (1956), where the Board conceded that there was a high degree 
of integration between the unit sought and the production process, but that such integra-
tion could not act as a bar. 
46 Thus the Board refused to allow units of tool room employees to be severed on an 
individual plant basis in the automobile industry. 
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the master contract allows deviations at the plant level and which 
are bargained at the local level.47 
Here in brief, then, is the manner in which the Board has at-
tempted to effectuate the policies established in Potash. The 
important question is: has craft severance under these principles 
disrupted stable labor relations? It was to answer this question, 
as well as the concomitant one of what changes, if any, would be 
desirable in the Potash doctrine, that the empirical research was 
undertaken. 
Methodology of the Study 
Data for the study were obtained in the following manner. An 
examination was made of the Decisions and Orders of the National 
Labor Relations Board between March I, 1954, the date of the 
Potash decision, and June I, 1957. In every instance where it 
appeared that the Board had ordered a craft severance election, a 
questionnaire was sent to the industrial relations director of the 
employer involved. Questionnaires were not sent to the local 
unions because of the difficulty in securing addresses. In order, 
however, to obtain union views, the author interviewed represen-
tatives of the United Automobile Workers, Steelworkers, Paper-
workers, and Machinists who had been involved in such elections. 
Admittedly, the views expressed could not verify or negate the 
results obtained from specific company representatives, but on 
broad questions there was a great deal of agreement between the 
company responses and the union representatives. 
In all, 99 questionnaires were mailed. Thirteen of these, how-
ever, were mailed to branch plants of four multi-plant companies. 
In these cases, there was one consolidated response from the cen-
tral office. These were counted as one questionnaire and one 
response. There were also five cases in which the election was a 
"Globe" election rather than a severance election. The adjusted 
total of questionnaires sent is, therefore, 85. There were 58 valid 
questionnaires returned, for a 72.6 percent response. 
For analysis, the returns were separated (1) according to 
whether the petitioning union was successful in severing a unit, 
and (2) according to the employer's opinion of the effect of the 
Board's policy upon stable labor relations. Table I summarizes 
the results. 
47 Continental Can Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1042 (1954). 
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TABLE I 
Where Severance Where Severance Total 
Opinion of Policy Occurred Did Not Occur 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Policy Conducive to Stable Labor 
Rdations ..••..•..••......... 7* 16.3 1 6.7 8 13.8 
Policy Not Conducive to Stable 
Labor Rdations .............. . 28** 65.1 13 86.6 41 70.7 
No Opinion Regarding Effect of 
Policy .........•....•........ 8 18.6 1 6.7 9 15.5 
Totals •............ 43 100.0 15 100.0 58 100.0 
•only 4 employers in this group were completely favorable toward the policy. Three employers 
expressed reservations regarding the policy. One stated that the policy had no effect; therefore, he 
did not care. llecause these opinions were not negative, they were included in this category • 
.. In one case, the employer had no bargaining experience with the severed unit. A strike occurred 
during the first negotiations, and during the strike the group renounced its new affiliation. In sub-
sequent tables the number 27 will therefore be used in this frame of reference. 
It is obvious that the majority of employers, both where sev-
erance occurred and where it did not occur, believe that the policy 
of craft severance is not conducive to stable labor relations. The 
question immediately arises whether this attitude is simply a belief 
or whether it is based upon experience. In order to assess the 
actual impact of severance, the questionnaires contained a series of 
questions designed to probe the effect of severance upon various 
aspects of the company's labor relations, such as number of griev-
ances, types of grievances, etc. The results are summarized in 
Table II.* 
Results Where the Employer Believes the Policy 
ls Not Conducive to Stable Labor Relations 
Rather surprisingly, the responses from those employers who 
believed that the policy is not conducive to stable labor relations 
and in whose companies severance occurred do not show any con-
sistent pattern. It would be difficult to conclude from this data 
that severance has had any great effect. In fact, and here is the key 
to the problem, 18 of these 28 employers admit that severance has 
had no significant effect upon their labor relations other than to 
increase negotiating time. When the responses are separated upon 
the company's evaluation of the effect of severance upon stable 
labor relations, as they are in Table III,* a pattern does begin to 
emerge. 
• See Appendix, Table II, p. 341 infra. 
• See Appendix, Table III, p. 344 infra. 
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Employers Reporting No Significant Effect Upon Labor Relations 
Table III verifies the opinions of the employers who report 
no significant effect upon their labor relations. With but few ex-
ceptions, severance has had little impact upon their labor relations 
programs. In three cases, however, the effect of severance was 
minimized because the severed unit renounced its new craft affilia-
tion and returned to the original bargaining unit.48 Even in those 
areas where severance appears to have had most effect - strikes 
and size of money settlements - the total effect has not been great. 
If severance has had such a minimal effect, why then are these em-
ployers opposed to it? 
Fear is the principal reason for opposing the severance of craft 
groups. This fear arises principally from two sources: from what 
is considered to be another threat to continued production and 
from the belief that, if more craft units are severed, it will not be 
possible to overcome the ill effects which are believed to be con-
nected with severance. These fears were stressed time and again 
by the respondents in this group. 
There is, of course, a greater threat to continued production 
where two or more unions represent the employees because there 
is a greater possibility of strikes. When all employees are in one 
union, compromises can be made and the minority group has to 
accept the decision. In any event, only one contract has to be 
negotiated. But when there is separate representation for small 
groups, each group can insist upon its demands and it can strike 
to support them. If the work of the group is of great importance 
in the production process, a strike by the small group may force 
the company to discontinue operations even though the majority 
of employees are willing to work. Although the strikes experienced 
by the employers in this group did not disrupt production,49 the 
possibility of a strike doing so is always present and constitutes a 
greater problem when there is more than one bargaining unit in 
a plant. 
The ill effects which these employers cite as reason for opposi-
. tion to severance include: increased jurisdictional disputes, ex-
cessive wage increases, possibility of further fragmentation of the 
bargaining unit, and the increased costs arising from severance. 
48 In one case, the severed group struck during the first contract negotiations. After 
striking for two weeks, the group renounced its craft affiliation; consequently, the em-
ployer never had a bargaining relationship with the craft group on a separate basis. 
49 In one case, the strike of the severed group lasted for two weeks. The production 
workers, however, refused to recognize the strike and, therefore, production was not in-
terrupted. The severed group finally returned to work without securing their demands. 
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The fear of increased jurisdictional disputes was stressed by 
most employers as a reason for opposing craft severance. It is be-
lieved that severance solidifies classification boundaries and makes 
it very difficult to cross these boundaries without incurring juris-
dictional problems. Thus, one company, while noting the slight 
effect of severance upon efficiency to this time, emphasized that the 
problem may become more acute in ·the future. This company has 
a highly integrated production process and one which is under-
going rapid technological change. The company fears, therefore, 
that in the future the crossing of craft lines may become more dif-
ficult. A concomitant fear, arising from the jurisdictional problem, 
is that cooperativeness of employees, and thereby efficiency, will 
be adversely affected if there is continued division of employees 
along craft lines in integrated industries. 
Excessive or unjustified wage increases which may have to be 
given to craft groups is another important reason for opposing 
severance. These employers fear that such wage increases may 
either distort their wage structures or place them at a competitive 
disadvantage. Thus, one employer remarked that it had been a 
"battle" to keep his wage structure from being whipsawed.Im 
Another respondent commented that the wage policies of craft 
unions, which did not take into account industry conditions but 
were based on geographical rates, "[put] pressure on our produc-
tion rates and can put manufacturers who have crafts in a disad-
vantageous labor-rate position with their competitors who do 
not." Although a major reason for the support of severance by 
craft employees arises from the belief that their wage rates should 
be substantially increased, most employers oppose such a move for 
fear that it will lead to an upward adjustment in production em-
ployees' rates or distort established wage structures. 
Further fragmentation of the bargaining unit by additional 
groups severing from it is a fear of many employers. Like the em-
ployer noted above, some employers are concerned with the effect 
further severance would have upon efficiency. The comment of 
one small company with 150 employees is indicative of the feelings 
of many: "If many crafts split off, results would probably be dis-
astrous. . . . Imagine trying to run a small plant with many dif-
ferent unions representing different crafts, each with a few mem-
bers." Other employers fear further fragmentation of the bargain-
50 This employer added that he had resisted giving a needed wage increase to the craft 
group for fear of whipsawing and because he believed that such a wage increase would be 
an incentive for other groups to attempt to sever. 
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ing unit because of the increased possibilities of work stoppages 
and thus of a greater threat to continued production. One reason 
for the minimal effect of severance upon the labor relations policies 
of these employers is that the size of the severed unit or units has 
been small in comparison to the production unit. For this reason, 
the economic power of the severed group has been low, and thus 
the effect of severance has been minimized. There is a fear, how-
ever, that further severance might alter this balance of power 
either through the severance of larger units or by the severance 
of numerous units that would cooperate with each other. 
And, last of all, there is opposition to severance because of 
the increased negotiation time. For small companies, this increased 
time represents an important cost; for large companies there is 
increased strain on the part of both supervisors and the industrial 
relations staff. Most employers do not believe that the cost to the 
employer is worth the value that employees receive. 
Employers Reporting Adverse Effect Upon Labor Relat_ions 
In large measure, the fears expressed by the above group of em-
ployers have become realities for this group. There is no doubt 
that severance has definitely, and adversely, affected the labor rela-
tions of nine of these ten employers. Although severance has had 
an impact upon the labor relations of the tenth employer, the effect 
is not so serious as in the cases of the other nine. Table III does 
not, of course, show the effect of severance upon any one employer; 
nevertheless, the totals are revealing. 
Eight of the ten companies report that jurisdictional-type 
grievances have increased. In two cases, the companies indicate 
that they have been able to cope with the problem; however, in one 
instance this was accomplished only after job descriptions were 
revised. In the other companies, jurisdictional disputes are still 
an important problem; and, in every case, jurisdictional questions 
have had an adverse effect upon efficiency. 
Jurisdictional problems have affected efficiency in several ways. 
These problems have often led to drawing more rigid job classifica-
tion lines; consequently, flexibility is lost and skilled workers can-
not be used as effectively. For example, in one company which 
had three groups of machinists, two of the groups were allowed to 
sever. The duties of the third group, which was not severed, cut 
across the activities of the other two. Before severance occurred, 
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there were no serious work assignment problems, but after the 
severance there were constant disputes. In order to minimize these 
disputes, the company has had to define specifically the duties of 
each group. In other cases, efficiency has suffered in times of 
emergency because these classification lines prevent the easy trans-
fer of workers to areas where they are needed. 
A usual concomitant of severance has been the creation of new 
seniority units as well as new classification lines. The creation of 
new seniority units has also affected efficiency. When work re-
quirements in the severed unit increase, it is often impossible, as 
noted above, to transfer qualified employees on a temporary basis 
to the severed unit. Nor, usually, are qualified long-service workers 
willing to give up their seniority for a permanent transfer to be-
come junior employees in the severed unit. On the other hand, 
when work requirements in the severed unit decline, highly skilled 
and qualified workers must be laid off because they cannot be 
transferred to other jobs. 
As could be expected, where jurisdictional problems exist, 
there is antagonism and jealousy between the two groups. All eight 
employers having jurisdictional difficulties, as well as one other, 
report that this has been their experience. In all seven instances 
in which efficiency has been lowered as the result of severance, a 
decrease in the cooperativeness of employees because of this an-
tagonism was given as one reason for it. This problem is especially 
evident in cases such as the one noted above in which employees 
have been accustomed to working together and must continue to 
do so even though they are in different units. 
Pressure upon supervisors as a result of work assignment prob-
lems has also contributed to a decline in efficiency. More care 
must be exercised in making work assignments to avoid disputes, 
and more time is spent by supervisors in dealing with the problems 
which arise. As shown in Table III, six of the companies report 
that grievances have increased, and four of them state that they are 
finding it more difficult to settle them. 
Increased difficulty in grievance negotiation arises, however, 
not only from the work assignment problem but also from the 
"political''' nature of the grievances. Six companies, including two 
who are having jurisdictional problems, state that, since the sev-
erance occurred, there has been a tendency to use the grievance 
process to impress upon the membership the worth of the union. 
In some cases, it is the production union; in other cases, the craft 
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union;51 and in some cases it is both. Thus, one employer re-
marked, "Both groups are prone to take grievances to the top 
steps of the grievance procedure. It appears they are hopeful that 
matters will be settled to their benefit by top management or by 
threat of arbitration." Or, as another employer put it, "There is 
a tendency to be less objective - to see if political capital can be 
made of grievance discussions." 
Political considerations have also increased the difficulty of 
contract negotiations for many of these employers. Most employers 
in the total sample have found it more difficult to negotiate a con-
tract for the production unit because of the more complex issues 
and because the severed group was small and lacked strength; con-
sequently, the severed group had to accept the pattern negotiated 
by the production unit. For the employers in this group, the ex-
perience has been somewhat different. The strength of the severed 
unit has tended to be greater,52 and, as a result, it has often been 
more aggressive in its demands. There has thus been a greater 
tendency for both units to use contract negotiations for political 
purposes - the production unit must win gains to prevent further 
disaffiliation and the severed unit has to try to fulfill the promises 
made to secure recognition. 
This need of the severed group accounts in large part for the 
four strikes that have occurred as a result of severance.53 Although 
one of these strikes failed when the severed group over-estimated 
its strength and the production workers refused to support it, the 
other three strikes resulted in wage increases, in one instance a 
very substantial increase, or other benefits. Moreover, in two addi-
tional cases, the severed unit has been able to secure wage increases 
by simply threatening to strike.54 
51 One employer, while noting an increase in the number of grievances from the 
production unit, reports a decline in the number of grievances from the craft unit. Before 
severance, the craft group was forcing "petty" complaints through the grievance process in 
order to secure attention. 
52 In contrast to the severed units of those employers who report no effect upon their 
labor relations, the severed group here tends to be either: (1) larger in relation to the pro-
duction unit; (2) a departmental unit that is vital to operations; or (3) made up of sev-
eral groups which have been severed out, which creates a condition conducive to whip-
sawing. In addition, two employers who stated it was more difficult to negotiate a contract 
for the production unit than formerly believe that this difficulty is the result of severance 
which had weakened the production union. The production union attempts to cover up 
its weakness and to impress its members by more "militant" and prolonged bargaining. 
53 One company reported strikes by both the production and the severed unit. It is 
not clear, however, whether the production unit strike was a result of severance; for that 
reason, it is not included. 
M The power of the severed unit is vividly displayed in one of these cases. Not only 
was the employer forced to grant a sizeable wage increase to the severed unit, which rep-
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It is very apparent that severance has had a considerable impact 
upon the stability of labor relations in these companies. Some 
companies have been more affected by severance than others. All, 
as a result of their experience, are strongly opposed to the principle 
of craft severance. 
Results Where Employers Believe the Policy Is 
Conducive to Stable Labor Relations 
Seven employers view favorably the NLRB's severance policy. 
Of the seven, however, only four are completely favorable; the 
others express reservations. Two employers stated that the policy 
is conducive to stable relations only if highly skilled people are 
allowed to sever; both believe that the policy would be harmful if 
severance is allowed for employees with minor skills or relation-
ships. The other employer, as a result of his experience, does not 
believe that the policy had any effect one way or the other; con-
sequently, the company is not opposed to it. 
Table II shows that severance has had little if any adverse 
effect upon the labor relations policies of these employers. Three 
of them report wage increases for the severed group, but these in-
creases are not viewed as a harmful development but rather as a 
needed and desirable adjustment. Although four employers report 
that there was a decline in the cooperativeness of their employees 
and one reports an increase in jurisdictional-type grievances, none 
regard these developments as serious. Moreover, there was no ad-
verse effect upon efficiency; and, in fact, three of them report that 
efficiency has improved as a result of severance. In addition, 
further benefits of severance include a decline in the number of 
grievances for four companies, less difficulty in negotiating griev-
ances for one company, and an increase in the cooperativeness of 
employees in another. 
Statistics, however, do not adequately explain the reasons why 
some of these employers view the severance policy so favorably. In 
some instances, severance provided a solution for serious problems 
which had arisen among the skilled group. Many of these problems 
stemmed from the dissatisfaction of the skilled workers with the 
representation, or lack of representation, they had received from 
resents a large minority of his work force, but he was also compelled to grant a more 
costly benefit plan. Although he has resisted wage increases for the production unit, he 
has had to extend the liberalized benefit plan to them. The production unit is, of course, 
dissatisfied. As a result of severance, the employer is faced with a higher wage cost than 
his competitors and also has an uncooperative work force. 
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the union representing the production employees. In one instance, 
this dissatisfaction was so great that the skilled group had struck to 
secure separate representation before the severance election took 
place. Much the same situation prevailed in three other com-
panies, although the dissatisfaction was not expressed so overtly. 
Nor does it appear that the union representing the "p and m" 
unit in some of these cases was too unhappy over the severance 
even though they formally opposed it. In at least two instances, 
· the union representing the production employees found the skilled 
workers a constant source of irritation. The dissatisfaction of the 
skilled group was expressed in several ways including the forcing of 
petty complaints to the top step of the grievance procedure and the 
failure to support the union on other questions. In both companies, 
the number of employees involved was not large; thus, the union 
representing the production employees did not suffer great finan-
cial loss or loss of bargaining power. 
The experience of these employers with severance has thus 
either been favorable or without important effect. Yet, as noted 
above, there is some fear that unlimited severance can become 
harmful to stable labor relations. It is of significance that the size 
of the unit severed in relation to the production unit is small; and, 
in every instance, there was only one group severed. If this situa-
tion should change, there might well be a change in the attitude 
of these companies. 
Results Where Employer Has No Opinion Regarding Effect 
of Policy Upon Stable Labor Relations 
Severance has had little adverse effect upon these employers 
other than to increase negotiating time. However, this increase 
has not been great - usually only a few hours. Three companies 
report that severance resulted in a wage increase, but this develop-
ment is not viewed unfavorably. One company also reports a slight 
increase in juri.sdictional grievances, but, again, this problem is 
not regarded as serious. There have been no strikes. 
·An other effects of severance in these companies can be classed 
as beneficial. In two instances, grievances have decreased; and 
these employers, as well as one other, report an increase in effi-
ciency. In another company, severance has resulted in greater co-
operativeness - the skilled employees are now more willing to 
work with production employees, and the production employees 
are not resentful toward the skilled employees for leaving the unit. 
Moreover, one employer b_elieves that, if severance had not been 
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allowed, production problems would have greatly increased be-
cause of the intense dissatisfaction of the skilled people with the 
representation they had been receiving. The evidence thus indi-
cates that the benefits derived from severance in these companies 
outweigh the disadvantages connected with it. 
Again, as in the case of the employers reporting that the policy 
was conducive to stable labor relations, there was only one unit 
severed; and the size of the severed unit, with one exception, was 
small in comparison to the production unit. In _the one exception, 
40 employees were severed from a total bargaining unit of 100. In 
this case, however, the 40 employees were a distinct skilled group 
with little interplay with the other employees. 
Employer Attitudes Where Severance Did Not Occur 
Table IV* summarizes the replies of the 14 employers in the 
cases in which the petitioning union was unsuccessful in severing 
the skilled workers from the "p and m" unit. The attitude of these 
employers toward severance is divided very similarly to that of those 
employers where severance did occur: 11 view the NLRB's sev-
erance policy unfavorably; one views it favorably, and 2 have no 
opm10n. 
Employers who believe that the policy is not conducive to stable 
labor relations do so for reasons similar to those of employers who 
oppose the policy where severance did occur: fear of jurisdictional 
problems and strikes, fear of having two or more competing unions, 
and fear of added costs. The general attitude of this group of em-
ployers is summed up very well by one company representative who 
remarked, "The more different unions you have to negotiate with, 
the more complex your labor relations become. We would prefer 
to have one union representing our entire plant .... " More-
over, the one company which does favor the severance policy does 
not do so on the basis that it is conducive to stable labor relations, 
but because the company is opposed to compulsory unionism. This 
company believes, therefore, that skilled employees should have 
separate representation if they so desire. 
· Threats of severance, it is interesting to note, have not caused 
most of these companies to change their labor policies as they affect 
the skilled workers. In only two companies has there been any 
change, and in both instances the skilled groups were given wage 
increases. A third company was willing to give an increase, but 
• See Appendix, p. 346 infra. 
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the union would agree to it only if it were given to all employees. 
Most employers are of the opinion, however, that their labor 
policies are fair and do not require any changes, although they 
readily recognize that there is dissatisfaction among the skilled 
workers and that one important reason for the dissatisfaction is the 
narrow wage differential between craft and production workers. It 
is the belief of most employers, as will be discussed below, that the 
major source of dissatisfaction among skilled workers is the in-
adequate represen~ation which they have received from the union. 
Severance and Employee Desire 
There is no question about the desires of many craft workers -
they do want separate representation. Of the 79 elections which 
took place in the employing units included in this study, the em-
ployees voted for severance in 56 of them-or in 70.9 percent of 
the cases. In the majority of them, the vote was heavily in favor of 
severance, with 15 cases resulting in a unanimous vote. Moreover, 
in 16 of the 23 cases in which the petitioning union lost the elec-
tion, the vote was very close; in two cases there were tie votes. This 
desire of craft people for separate representation has also been 
found by other investigators.66 
Craft workers desire separate representation for several reasons 
of which the most important are a belief that the union represent-
ing the "p and m" unit is not providing adequate representation 
for the skilled group, a belief that their status is being undermined, 
a belief that they will have greater job opportunities if they are 
members of a craft union, and a dissatisfaction toward the incum-
bent union that has been aroused by a dissident faction or leader. 
Of these reasons, inadequate representation appears to be the most 
important. There is widespread belief among craft people that 
their problems and interests are not properly considered in a large 
unit. In part, this feeling encompasses the problems of wages and 
status, but it also is more than that. As skilled workers, they be-
lieve they have problems different from those of other employees 
and that only a craft representative can understand these problems. 
Moreover, as a minority, they can be outvoted on every issue, and 
they believe their interests are often not properly considered. 
Second in importance is the question of status, including the 
wage aspect. The narrowing of wage differentials between skilled 
55 Krislov, "Administrative Approaches to Craft Severance," 5 LAB. L.J. 231 at 239 
(1954). 
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and production employees has been a cause for great dissatisfaction. 
In addition, there is also the feeling that there is a loss of status in 
being represented by an industrial union. There is among skilled 
workers a pride in the craft that is not given adequate recognition 
except by the union representing the craft. 
In several cases, one major reason for desiring separate represen-
tation "is the belief that craft representation would lead to greater 
job opportunities. In areas where the craft is highly organized, it 
is believed that membership in the craft union will open up job 
opportunities in the trade. These opportunities are apparently 
regarded more highly than the job opportunities and job security 
lost in the plant because of a narrower seniority unit. 
Dissatisfaction which stemmed from the operation of a dis-
sident faction or leader is an important element in some of the 
cases. In at least two instances, it appears to be the sole reason for 
severance; and, in one case, when the group became disenchanted 
with the leader, they returned to their former bargaining unit. It 
must also be recognized that, in, part, this reason often merges with 
the first reason noted - inadequate representation. 
That there is substance underlying the craft workers' dissatis-
faction is revealed by the widespread agreement, as shown in Table 
II, that the interests of the craft workers are better served as a result 
of severance. Although the employers who opposed the severance 
policy are more inclined to believe that the craft employees did not 
benefit from severance, more than half of them did answer in the 
affirmative. As noted above, there are many indications that craft 
workers are better satisfied with craft representation - the lower 
number of grievances that develop among craft people after sev-
erance is a good example. 
Employers who believe that the craft employees have not gained 
from severance cite most often as the reason for their belief the 
loss in job security. Where severance has occurred, the craft work-
ers have had their "bumping" rights restricted to their particular 
units. In several instances, this had led to the layoff of skilled 
workers, whereas, formerly, they could have displaced workers in 
less skilled jobs. In addition, it was frequently pointed out that 
the skilled workers had received no wage increases or other bene-
fits.156 Frequently, bargaining for the skilled group does not take 
56 The union representative also stressed this point. A UAW international representa-
tive pointed out that in one instance the monthly dues of the craft group have more than 
doubled without any tangible results. 
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place until after the contract for the production unit is negotiated, 
and the pattern established there is closely followed for the skilled 
group. In three cases, dissatisfaction with craft affiliation has 
caused skilled groups to renounce their craft affiliation and return 
to the original unit. The evidence indicates, however, that most 
craft employees are better satisfied with craft representation, and 
this is true regardless of whether they have received· any material 
benefits. 
Nor have the interests of production workers been greatly 
harmed by the severance of craft employees. In only five cases does 
it appear that the interests of production workers were adversely 
affected by severance; in three cases, because of loss of promotional 
opportunity, and in two cases, from loss of bargaining strength. 
With but few exceptions, however, the production group remains 
the dominant group and has the economic power to back up its 
demands. This conclusion was verified by representatives of the 
Automobile Workers and the Paperworkers. 
Conclusions 
In answer to the question posed above, "Has craft severance 
under the principles established in the Potash decision disrupted 
stable labor relations," the answer is yes - but not a~ much as 
feared when the policy was first announced. Logically, the Board's 
action could have been extremely disruptive; empirically, the effect 
does not appear to have been so great as was feared. On the other 
hand, there seems to be no question that separate representation is 
desired by many craftsmen. The evidence also indicates, as the 
Board believed, that craft groups are better satisfied with separate 
representation, and this helps, in some measure, to promote better 
labor relations. Moreover, the interests of production workers are 
seldom harmed by severance. 
Severance can have, and sometimes does have, an unstabilizing. 
effect upon labor relations, as indicated in the cases discussed 
above. In nine cases, this effect was very unstabilizing. Moreover, 
there is an intangible factor often connected with severance that 
cannot be properly evaluated. One employer put it best when he 
remarked, "A climate of hostility is generated between ·union 
representatives; a competitive situation develops and the company 
in self-defense becomes more restrained and rigid in its relationship 
with the unions." This pressure upon management undoubtedly 
has an effect upon the morale of the organization. However, it can-
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not be questioned that severance has had a beneficial effect upon 
the labor relations of some employers, thus offsetting, to some 
extent, the detrimental effect upon others. 
Where severance has had an adverse effect upon stability of 
labor relations, the following reasons appear to be significant. 
First, work groups have been broken up without regard for work 
requirements or without including all of the craftsmen in the unit. 
Thus, in one case discussed above, two departmental groups of 
machinists were allowed to sever, but the third was not even though 
the work of the third group overlapped that of the other two. If the 
Westinghouse rule requiring all craftsmen to be included in the 
departmental unit were again enforced, as it is for craft groups, this 
difficulty could be avoided and the adverse effect of severance 
would be lessened. 
In other cases, the Board has unnecessarily broken up working 
relationships by declaring a craft unit appropriate when a depart-
mental unit would have been equally appropriate. In one of the 
cases discussed above, the Board divided a group of employees who 
were constantly working together by declaring that a craft unit was 
appropriate while at the same time conceding that a departmental 
unit, sought by the petitioning union, would also have been appro-
priate. This problem also develops when a maintenance group is 
divided into several units with one union representing two or more 
of the units, with some of the maintenance employees remaining 
in the production unit. In one situation of this nature, trouble was 
averted when the craft union, the production union and the em-
ployer recognized the absurdity of the situation, disregarded the 
Board's certification, and negotiated one contract for all mainte-
nance employees even though some of them were officially in the 
production unit. 
It would also appear, in connection with working relationships, 
that the Board could give more weight to the degree of integration 
of the production process in determining whether severance should 
take place. The present policy of the Board in ordering mandatory 
elections, except in those industries to which the National Tube 
doctrine has been applied, has restored in a modified form the 
concept of "exclusive jurisdiction."57 It is highly questionable 
whether this policy conforms with the intent of Congress in amend-
57 K.risl~v, "The NLRB on Craft Severance: One Year of American Potash," 6 LAB. 
L.J. Z75 (1955). 
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ing section 9 (b). Not only does the legislative history of the amend-
ments fail to reveal such an intent, but, as the court pointed out in 
the recent Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company case,58 the Board's 
direction of elections on the basis of "traditional representative" 
and "true craft" represents a failure of the Board to carry out its 
statutory obligation to determine the appropriate unit in each 
instance after an examination of all the facts. The Court stated: 
"The Board was not authorized by the amendment to 
surrender to anyone else its statutory duty to determine in 
each case the appropriate unit for collective bargaining. It 
had been set up by Congress as an independent body presumed 
to possess expert knowledge and wisdom in the field superior 
to that of the courts or of Congress or of the active participants 
in the industrial world and therefore better fitted than any-
one else to decide what would best serve the working man in 
his effort to bargain collectively with his employer, and what 
would best serve the interest of the country as a whole."59 
The court concluded, therefore, that the Board had erred in taking 
the position that it had no alternative but to order severance elec-
tions when there was a true craft and a traditional representative. 
In determining whether severance should be permitted, the 
Board should consider, therefore, the nature of the production 
process.59a Although it is possible to push the principle of integra-
tion to the extreme and allow no severance on the basis that there is 
some integration of the production process in every case, such a 
course is not necessary. A return to the criteria, such as the loca-
tion of the work performed, utilized before Potash seems all that 
is necessary. This action, along with that noted above, would pre-
vent unnecessary disruption of work relationships. 
The second factor in whether severance will have an effect upon 
stability of labor relations is the size of the severed unit in relation 
to the production unit. If the severed unit is small, the effect is 
much less than when it is large. Where the severed unit is large, 
there is more likely to be a competitive rivalry between the two 
units, and both units have power to back up their demands. 
Equally important is the third_ factor - the number of units 
58 (4th Cir. 1959) 270 F. (2d) 169. In this case, the court reversed a board determi-
nation that there should be a severance election because the Board's policy of allowing 
severance elections in some industries and not doing so in others was discriminatory. 
The court believed that the reasons for denying severance elections in those industries to 
which the National Tube doctrine had been applied were present in the glass industry. 
59 Id. at 173. 
59a This approach may have to be adopted by the Board because the Supreme Court 
has denied certiorari, 28 U.S. LAw WEEK 3217 (1960). 
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severed. Where there was more than one unit severed, there 
tended to be a greater effect upon the stability of labor relations. 
Thus, the fear expressed by many employers that the severance of 
additional units would be harmful is borne out by experience. The 
effect upon small employers tends, of course, to be greater than for 
large employers. 
It may well be that the problem of craft severance has not be-
come so acute as was feared because of the developments in the 
labor movement itself. The AFL-CIO No Raiding Agreement of 
1955, which was later included in the constitution of the merged 
federation, has had a decided impact upon the number of severance 
elections.6° For example, of the 79 elections analyzed in this study, 
54 occurred before January 1, 1956. Although the number of 
severance elections increased briefly in 1957, the trend appears to 
be in the direction of fewer elections rather than more. However, 
there is no doubt that there will continue to be some elections, for 
a few unions within the federation have continued their "raiding" 
activities; and certain independent unions, such as the Tool and 
Die Craftsmen, are vigorously attempting to secure new members. 
It also appears that, through the possibility of severance, many 
craft groups have brought their dissatisfactions to the attention 
of the industrial union representing them. Some unions, such as 
the UAW, have taken large measures, including structural revision 
through constitutional amendments, to deal with the problem. 
Others, however, have done nothing; and it is significant that, in 
those cases in which severance did not occur, only three local 
unions adopted measures to deal with the dissatisfactions which 
led the craft group to attempt to sever. In another instance, the 
union deliberately set out to punish the dissidents. It is for this 
reason, among others, that the possibility for some relief must be 
available. 61 
In assessing the impact of severance upon the stability of labor 
relations, one has to conclude, therefore, that: the actual impact 
60 As Dunlop pointed out, the labor movement did not find a return to "exclusive 
jurisdiction" to its liking and has adopted what he calls the "principle of established 
bargaining relationships." Dunlop, "Structural Changes in the American Labor Move-
ment and Industrial Relations System," in PROCEEDINGS, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RE.sEARCH 
AssOCIATION 12 (1956). 
61 The Board does not allow severance for the purpose of decertification; thus craft 
employees cannot withdraw their union affiliation to place pressure upon the union to 
consider their needs. The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 
(Landrum-Griffin bill) [P.L. 86-257, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 1959] does, however, contain 
provisions which may provide a solution in those instances where there is actual dis-
crimination. 
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has not been so great as feared. In part, this result has been caused 
by action of the labor movement itself. One can also sugge~t that 
the Board could revise its policy along the lines indicated above to 
provide both self-determination and greater stability of labor rela-
tions. The Potash decision enthroned the principle of self-deter-
mination for craft groups over the stability of labor relations; both 
objectives are equally valid as a matter of public policy. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE II 
Employers' Opinions Regarding Effect of Severance on Stability 
of Labor Rdations 
Policy No Opinion 
341 
Poli% Not 
Con ucive Conducive Regarding Totals 
to Stable to Stable Policy 
Questions Relations Relations 
Num- Per- Num- Per- Num- Per- Num- Per-
her cent her cent her cent her cent 
lncerescs of Craft Group 
Better Served (More Pa), 
Better Representation, etc. 
Yes .•.....•.......... 15 55.6 4 57.1 4 50.0 23 54.8 
No ................... 10 37.0 2 28.6 1 12.5 13 31.0 
Yes and No ............ 2 7.4 0 0 1 12.5 3 7.1 
No Opinion ........... 0 0 1 14.3 2 25.0 3 7.1 ---
Totals ..•..... 27 100.0 7 100.0 8 100.0 42 100.0 ---
Interests of Production 
Workers Have Suffered 
(Lowered Bargaining Pow-
er, Loss of Promotional 
Opportunities, etc.) 
Yes .................. 4 14.8 0 0 1 12.5 5 11.9 
No ................... 22 81.5 7 100.0 7 87.5 36 85.7 
YesandNo ............ 1 3.7 0 0 0 0 1 2.4 





Less than 30 %- ...... 
Great Increase-
7 25.9 3 42.8 3 37.5 13 31.0 
More than 30 % ...... 19 70.4 1 14.3 2 25.0 22 52.4 
No Effect ............. 1 3.7 1 14.3 3 37.5 5 11.9 
Decrease ....... •••.••• 0 0 2 28.6 0 0 2 4.7 
------
Totals ........ 27 100.0 7 100.0 8 100.0 42 100.0 
---
Severance and Contract Ne-
gotiations-Greater Diffi-
culcy in Negotiating Con-
tract for 
Severed Unit ........... 9 33.3 0 0 4 50.0 13 31.0 
Production Unit ........ 12 44.5 6 85.7 3 37.5 21 50.0 
Both Units Equally Dif-
ficulc .•....•..••.•.• 6 22.2 1 14.3 1 12.5 8 19.0 
---
Totals ........ 27 100.0 7 100.0 8 100.0 42 100.0 
Strikes as a Result of 
Severance 
Severed Unit ........... 8 28.6 0 0 0 0 8 18.6 
Production Unit ........ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
None ........•........ 20 71.4 7 100.0 8 100.0 35 100.0 
Totals ........ 28 100.0 7 100.0 8 100.0 43 100.0 
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TABLE II, continued 
Employers' Opinions Regarding Effect. of Severance on Stability 
of Labor Relations 
Policy Not Policy No Opinion 
Conducive Conducive Regarding 
co Stable co Stable Policy 
Questions Relations Relations 
[ Vol. 58 
Totals 
Num- Per• Num- Per- Num- Per- Num- Per-
her cent her cent her cent her cent 
Effect upon Size of Money 
Settlements 
No Effect ..........••• 19 70.4 4 57.1 5 62.5 28 66.7 
Increase 
Severed Unit ......... 8 29.6 3 42.9 2 25.0 13 31.0 
Production Unit .•••.. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Equalincrease ........ 0 0 0 0 1 12.5 1 2.3 -
Totals ........ 27 100.0 7 100.0 8 100.0 42 100.0 
Effect. upon Number of 
Grievances 
Increased ...•.......... 8 29.6 0 0 2 25.0 10 23.8 
Decreased .....•....... 1 3.7 4 57.1 6 75.0 11 26.2 
No Effect ............. 18 66.7 3 42.9 0 0 21 50.0 
---
Totals ..•..... 27 100.0 7 100.0 8 100.0 42 100.0 
Effect upon Grievance 
Negotiations 
More Difficult ......... 4 14.8 0 0 0 0 4 9.5 
Less Difficult ........... 1 3.7 1 14.3 0 0 2 4.7 
No Effect ............. 22 81.5 6 85.7 8 100.0 36 85.8 
---
Totals .....•.. 27 100.0 7 100.0 8 100.0 42 100.0 
Effect upon Types of 
Grievances 
Has Affecred 
J urisdiccional. ........ 9 33.3 1 14.3 1 12.5 11 26.2 
Ocher ....•.••...•... 0 0 0 1.0 0 0 0 0 
No Effect ....•......•. 18 66.7 6 85.7 7 87.5 31 73.8 
Totals ..•••... 27 100.0 7 100.0 8 100.0 42 100.0 
Effect upon Personnel Pro-
gram (Pension Plans, Va-
cation Plans, etc.) 
Has Affected .•......... 3 11.1 0 0 1 12.5 4 9.5 
No Effect •...•...•.•.. 24 88.9 7 100.0 7 87.5 38 90.5 
Totals ...•..•• 27 100.0 7 100.0 8 100.0 42 100.0 
Effect upon Cooperativeness 
of Employees 
Good .••..•..••...•... 0 0 1 14.3 1 12.5 2 4.8 
Adverse ...•....•.•.... 10 37.0 4 57.1 0 0 14 33.3 
No Effect ......•....•. 17 63.0 2 28.6 7 87.5 26 61.9 
Totals .••..••• 27 100.0 7 100.0 8 100.0 42 100.0 
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TABLE II, continued 
Employers' Opinions Regarding Effect of Severance on Stability 








co Stable to Stable Policy 
Questions Relations Relations 
Num- Per- Num- Per- Num- Per- Num- Per-
her cent her cent her cent her cent 
---
Effect upon Efficiency of 
Employees 
Good .••...•.......... 0 0 2 28.6 3 37.5 5 11.9 
Adverse ............... 7 25.9 0 0 0 0 7 16.7 
No Effect .•.•.......•. 20 74.1 5 71.4 5 62.5 30 71.4 
Totals ...•..•. 27 100.0 7 100.0 8 100.0 42 100.0 
---------
Number of Cases Where 
Severed Unit Returned co 
Former Unit .••....•..••. 3 100.0 0 0 0 0 3 100.0 
Effect upon Company's 
Labor Relations-Total 
Evaluation 
Good ..••....•...•...• 0 0 2 28.6 0 0 2 4.8 
Adverse ....•.•........ 15 55.5 0 0 0 0 15 35.7 
No Significant Effect 
Ocher than Increasing 
25.0 Negotiating Time .... 12 44.5 5 71.4 2 19 45.2 
No Opinion •.......••. 0 0 0 0 6 75.0 6 14.3 ------
Totals •..•...• 27 100.0 7 100.0 8 100.0 42 100.0 
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TABLE III 
Results of Cases Where Employees Repor1: That Severance Has Adversely 
Affected Their Labor Relations* 






Questions Relations Relations 
Num- Per- Num- Per- Num- Per-
ber cent ber cent ber cent 
Interests of Craft Group Better Served 
(More Pay, Better Representation, etc.) 
Yes ..•............................ 7 41.2 8 80.0 15 55.6 
No ............................... 8 47.0 2 20.0 10 37.0 
Yes and No .............••......... 2 11.8 0 0 2 7.4 
Totals .............•....... 17 100.0 10 100.0 27 100.0 
Interests of Production Workers Have 
Suffered (Lower Bargaining Power, Loss 
of Promotional Oppottunities, etc.) 
Yes ...........................•... 2 11.8 2 20.0 4 14.8 
No ............................... 14 82.3 8 80.0 22 81.5 
Yes and No ........................ 1 5.9 0 0 1 3.7 
Totals ..................... 17 100.0 10 100.0 27 100.0 
Effect upon Negotiating Time 
Small Increase-Less than 30 % ........ 7 41.2 0 0 7 25.9 
Great Increase-More than 30 % ....... 10 58.8 9 90.0 19 70.4 
No Effecc .......................... 0 0 1 10.0 1 3.7 
Totals ..................... 17 100.0 10 100.0 27 100.0 
Severance and Concracc Negotiation-
Greater Difficulty in Negotiating Contract 
for: 
Severed Unit ....................... 5 29.4 4 40.0 9 33.3 
Production Unit ..................... 8 47.1 4 40.0 12 44.5 
Boch Units Equally Difficult ........... 4 23.5 2 20.0 6 22.2 
Totals ..................... 17 100.0 10 100.0 27 100.0 
Strikes as a Result of Severance 
Severed Unit ....................... 4 22.2 4 40.0 8 28.6 
Produccion Unit ......•.........•.... 0 0 0 0 0 0 
None .•..••....•.•••............... 14 77.8 6 60.0 20 71.4 
Totals ..................... 18 100.0 10 100.0 28 100.0 
---
Effecc (of Severance) upon Size of Money 
Settlements 
No Effecc .......................... 13 76.5 6 60.0 19 70.4 
Increase 
Severed Unit ..................... 4 23.5 4 40.0 8 29.6 
Production Unit ................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Equal Increases .................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Totals ..................... 17 100.0 10 100.0 27 100.0 
• Number of employees in this group is 18. Because the employees in one case struck during the 
first negotiations and at the end of a 28•day strike voted to decertify the craft union, the employer had 
no bargaining experience with the craft union. In most categories, therefore, there are only I 7 responses. 
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TABLE III, continued 
Results of Cases Where Employees Report That Severance Has Adversely 
Affected Their Labor Relations 
No Effect Had Effect 
345 
upon upon Totals 
Labor Labor 
Questions Relations Relations 
------------------
Num- Per- Num- Per- Num- Per-




Severance) upon Number of 
Increased ........................... 2 11.8 6 60.0 9 29.6 
Decreased .......................... 1 5.9 0 0 1 3.7 
No Effect .......................... 14 82.3 4 40.0 18 66.7 
Totals ..................... 17 100.0 10 100.0 27 100.0 
Effect (of Severance) upon Grievance Ne-
gotiations 
More Difficult ...................... 0 0 4 40.0 4 14.8 
Less Difficult ....................... 1 5.9 0 0 1 3.7 
No Effect .......................... 16 94.1 6 60.0 22 81.5 
---
Totals ........•............ 17 100.0 10 100.0 27 100.0 
Effect (of Severance) upon Types of Griev-
ances 
Has Affected 
Jurisdictional. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5.9 8 80.0 9 33.3 
Other ........................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 
No Effect .......................... 16 94.1 2 20.0 18 66.7 
------
Totals ..............•...... 17 100.0 18 100.0 27 100.0 
------------
Effect (of Severance) upon Personnel Pro-
gram (Pension Plans, Vacation Plans, etc.) 
Has Affected ........................ 1 5.9 2 20.0 3 11.1 
No Effect .......................... 16 94.1 8 80.0 24 88.9 
Totals ..................... 17 100.0 10 100.0 27 100.0 
---------------
Effect {of Severance) upon Cooperativeness 
of Employees 
Good .............................. 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Adverse ............................ 1 5.9 9 90.0 10 37.0 
No Effect .......................... 16 94.1 1 10.0 17 63.0 
---------
Totals ..................... 17 100.0 10 100.0 27 100.0 
---
Effect upon Efficiency of Employees 
Good ............................. 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Adverse ............................ 0 0 7 70.0 7 25.9 
No Effect .......................... 17 100.0 3 30.0 20 74.1 
---------
Totals ..................... 17 100.0 10 100.0 27 100.0 
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TABLE IV 
Results of Cases in Which Severance Did Not Occur 
Questions 




No Opinion •....•.................................. 
Totals ••........•................•...•...... 
Has the severance attempt resulted in any changes in the company's 
labor relations policy? 
Yes •.•.•.••.....................•................. 
No .....••......................•...........•..... 
No Opinion ......................•................. 
Totals .•••................................... 
Has the severance attempt resulted in any changes in the union's 
policy regarding skilled workers? 
Yes* .•......••••.•........•......................• 
No •••••..•.••...•.....•.......................... 
No Opinion •......................................• 
Totals •..•...............•...•............... 
Em_ployer's Opinion of Effect of Craft Severance Policy upon 
Stability of Labor Relations 
Favorable •••.••.•••.........................•...... 
Unfavorable ..........•......................•...... 
No Opinion •....................................... 



















• Three unions attempted to relieve the dissatisfaction of skilled workers; one union attempted to 
punish the skilled workers for the severance attempt. 
